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1 Introduction
The effects of taxation on incidence and welfare are the central issues in
public economics. While there are many questions in taxation theory, one
practical question is how to design the tax system when the government
faces a budget constraint. If the government is to supply a variety of public
services and remedy income inequality, it needs a certain level of tax rev-
enue. Under this motivation, two approaches have been developed.1 The
first approach characterizes optimal taxation by assuming that the welfare-
maximizing government chooses tax rates so as not to decrease tax revenue.2
The second approach examines the welfare effect of the change in multiple
tax rates that leaves tax revenue unchanged.3 Both of these approaches pro-
vide useful answers to the question raised above, but the optimal taxation
theory has been criticized because it is almost impossible for the government
to correctly know the necessary information on consumer preferences and
production technologies. The tax reform theory complements this limitation
of the optimal taxation theory.
This paper examines the effects of revenue-neutral tax reform in verti-
cally related industries. One notable difference from the existing literature
is that we assume an oligopoly in the final goods industry and monopolistic
competition in the intermediate goods industry. There are two reasons for
considering the revenue-neutral tax reform and the above-mentioned market
structure. First, there is no literature that examines the revenue-neutral tax
reform in this case, except for Colangelo and Galmarini (2001). Second, there
is evidence that supports our modelling.
1See, for example, Atkinson and Stiglitz (2015) and Salanie (2011) for a comprehensive
account.
2Instead of welfare, the government’s objective is assumed to be the weighted sum of
welfare and campaign contribution in the political economy literature.
3Depending on the purpose of the paper, different constraints are assumed. For ex-
ample, Keen and Ligthart (2002, 2005) consider the change in import tariff and domestic
tax that keeps the consumer price constant. In other words, these authors stress the tax
reform such that consumer’s utility remains unchanged.
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Referring to the evidence of the Economist, Shapiro (2018) lists several
examples of industries that experience a rise in the four-firm concentration
ratio from 1997 to 2012.4 Grullon et al. (2019) also provides evidence that
during the same period the Herfindahl-Hirschman index has risen in more
than 75% of US industries (mainly manufacturing industries), and that the
average increase in concentration levels has reached 90%. While the above
evidence concerns the final goods industry, there is an empirical literature
finding that monopolistic competition well describes the intermediate goods
industry. For instance, Liu et al. (2013, p. 740) empirically show that
‘China’s construction industry is in monopolistic competition’ from 2009 to
2011. Apergis and Polemis (2015, p. 6) add further evidence showing mo-
nopolistic competition in several intermediate goods industries.
These data justify the situation in which the downstream industry is
oligopolistic and the upstream industry is monopolistically competitive. And,
we assume that both final and intermediate goods are taxed. The main
results are as follows. First, the revenue-neutral shift from intermediate
goods taxes to final goods taxes lowers both the consumer and producer
prices of final goods. And, the demand price of intermediate goods falls, but
the producer price of intermediate goods is unaffected by this policy reform.
Second, this tax reform raises welfare.
This paper draws on the literature on commodity taxation under imper-
fect competition.5 The literature is so large that we list two closely-related
papers. Delipalla and Keen (1992) develop a homogeneous good Cournot
model to examine the revenue-neutral tax shift from specific to ad valorem
taxation. While Delipalla and Keen (1992) assume a homogeneous good,
Anderson et al. (2001a, b) consider how product differentiation, the mode
of competition (Cournot or Bertrand) and free entry affect Delipalla and
4The Economist, 26 March 2016, “Too Much of a Good Thing,” available at
https://www.economist.com/news/briefing/21695385-profits-are-too-high-america-needs-
giant-dose-competition-too-much-good-thing.
5Keen (1998) provides a comprehensive survey.
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Keen’s (1992) result. Anderson et al. (2001b) show that specific taxation
can involve higher welfare than ad valorem taxation in a free entry Bertrand
oligopoly.
The literature introduced above focuses on final goods taxation, but Kon-
ishi (1990), Colangelo and Galmarini (2001) and Peitz and Reisinger (2014)
allow for a vertical market.6 Assuming perfect competition in the upstream
industry and a free entry oligopoly in the downstream industry, Konishi
(1990) finds that intermediate goods taxation raises welfare. The compari-
son with the other papers is given in Table 1. Assuming a free entry oligopoly
both in the upstream and downstream industries, Peitz and Reisinger (2014)
demonstrate that ad valorem taxation for the downstream industry is the
most efficient. It should be noted that Peitz and Reisinger (2014) ignore the
government’s budget constraint.
(Table 1 around here)
Colangelo and Galmarini (2001) are the most closely-related paper. In
contrast to Peitz and Reisinger (2014), they assume a restricted entry oligopoly
in both industries. As mentioned earlier, Colangelo and Galmarini (2001) are
the only paper to examine the revenue-neutral tax reform in vertically re-
lated markets. Their novel result is that the revenue-constrained government
should tax final goods and subsidize intermediate goods. There are two dif-
ferences among Colangelo and Galmarini (2001), Peitz and Reisinger (2014)
and this paper. First, as Table 1 shows, we assume that the number of final
goods firms is exogenous and that the number (mass) of intermediate goods
is endogenous. This modelling reflects the empirical evidence noted earlier.
Second, we allow product differentiation of both final and intermediate goods
while the above two authors assume homogeneous goods.
6In a context of environmental economics, Sugeta and Matsumoto (2007) show that a
tax shift from intermediate goods to final goods raises welfare.
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This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a model. Sections
3 and 4 consider the effects of the revenue-neutral tax reform on incidence
and welfare, respectively. Section 5 concludes.
2 Model
This section presents the model. Since our model is seemingly complicated,
we begin by listing the assumptions.
1. A representative consumer consumes horizontally differentiated goods
and a homogeneous good. The homogeneous good serves as a numeraire
good, and its price is normalized to one.
2. Labor is the only primary factor of production.
3. One unit of labor produces one unit of the numeraire good under perfect
competition. Hence, from the profit maximizing condition, the wage
rate is equal to one.
4. Each differentiated good is produced by assembling a variety of inter-
mediate goods under the CES technology.
5. Each intermediate good is produced from labor with constant marginal
cost and fixed cost.
6. Downstream (final goods) firms choose output under Cournot oligopoly,
taking the intermediate goods prices as given. The number of down-
stream firms is exogenously given.
7. Upstream (intermediate goods) firms choose output/price in monopo-
listic competition.
8. An ad valorem commodity tax is imposed on final and intermediate
goods.
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9. Profits of downstream firms and tax revenue are redistributed to the
consumer in a lump-sum fashion.
Based on these assumptions, we will derive the equilibrium.7
2.1 Consumer Behavior
The representative consumer chooses consumption to maximize utility. As
to the consumer’s preference, we follow Pflüger (2001, 2004) and Haufler and
Pflüger (2004), and assume a quasi-linear utility function. Noting Assump-
tion 1 above, we consider the following utility maximization problem.














piyi + z = I, (2)
where Y is the quantity index, n ≥ 1 is the number of differentiated goods,
yi is consumption of variety i, z is consumption of homogeneous good, pi is
the consumer price of variety i, and I is national income. σ is the elasticity
of substitution among differentiated goods.
Solving the above problem yields the inverse demand and demand func-































piyi = PY = 1.
7Robustness of the main result is in alternative assumptions is left in Supplementary
Note.
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2.2 Final Goods Industry







, η > 1,
where m is the mass of intermediate inputs, qj is the price of intermediate
good j, and η is the elasticity of substitution among intermediate inputs.





where t is an ad valorem tax rate on the final goods, and the inverse de-
mand function is given by (3). Noting Assumption 6 above, maximizing this
profit with respect to yi, we obtain the per-firm output, industry output and
consumer price as follows.
y =
(σ − 1)(n− 1)
(1 + t)σn2Q
, ny =




(σ − 1)(n− 1)
. (5)
2.3 Intermediate Goods Industry
Utilizing (5), we now characterize the equilibrium in the intermediate goods
market. Applying Shephard’s Lemma to the unit cost function Q, the








(1− η)q−ηj ny︸ ︷︷ ︸
demand
= Qηq−ηj
(σ − 1)(n− 1)
(1 + t)σnQ
=





where xj is supply of intermediate good j.
As assumed in Assumption 7 above, monopolistic competition prevails
in the upstream industry. Upstream firms choose either price or output by
taking the price index Q as given, and free entry drives profit to zero. Each
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firm produces one variety of intermediate good with marginal cost c > 0 and





− cxj − f,
where τ is an ad valorem tax on the intermediate goods.
As in Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) and Ethier (1982), the first-order condition
for profit maximization, the zero profit condition, and the market-clearing
condition (6) jointly determine the price, output and mass of intermediate








(σ − 1)(n− 1)
(1 + t)(1 + τ)σηnf
. (7)
This completes the description of our model. Once q, x andm are determined
in (7), all the other endogenous variables are obtained by substituting (7).
3 Incidence of the Revenue-Neutral Tax Re-
form
Making use of the model above, we explore the effects of a tax reform. As
mentioned in Introduction, keeping a certain level of tax revenue is arguably
the most important concern from the government’s point of view. For this
reason, this paper focuses on an increase in the final goods tax and a decrease
in the intermediate goods tax that leave total tax revenue unchanged.











(σ − 1)(n− 1)τ
(1 + t)(1 + τ)σn
,
where the first term in the middle and last equations is the revenue from
downstream taxation, and the second term is the revenue from upstream
taxation. Note that the last equation is obtained by substituting (7) and
(5). Totally differentiating T and setting the resulting expression to zero, the
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revenue-neutral tax reform requires that dT = (∂T/∂t)dt + (∂T/∂τ)dτ = 0.
Rearranging this equation, we have
dτ = − ∂T/∂t
∂T/∂τ
dt = −(1 + τ)[σn(1 + τ)− (σ − 1)(n− 1)τ ]
(σ − 1)(n− 1)(1 + t)
dt. (8)
This is the rule of the revenue-neutral tax reform. Eq. (8) suggests that
the upstream tax must be lowered (dτ < 0) if the government raises the
downstream tax (dt > 0) and keeps tax revenue constant. In what follows,
we assume this case: the other polar case is considered just by reversing the
sign of dt.
The reason for the opposite sign of dt and dτ is as follows.8 In our
model, final goods taxation not only influences the final goods market but
also influences the intermediate goods market by changing the downstream
firms’ demand for intermediate goods. When the government raises t, revenue
from final goods tax and that from intermediate goods tax as follows. First,
due to the assumption of constant elasticity demand, the consumer’s total
expenditure (npy) remains constant. Thus, as a direct effect, revenue from
final goods tax increases. Second, an increase in t reduces the downstream
firms’ demand for intermediate goods and the mass of intermediate goods.
But, from Eq. (7) the price and output of intermediate goods does not
change. As a result of this indirect effect, revenue from intermediate goods
tax decreases with t. Summing these conflicting effects up, total tax revenue
rises with t since the direct effect dominates the indirect effect.
As explained above, final goods taxation influences revenue from final
goods tax and that from intermediate goods tax. In contrast, this is not the
case of intermediate goods taxation. Any tax change has no effect on the
consumer’s total expenditure because of the constant demand elasticity. And,
the same observation is true of the total expenditure for intermediate goods
(mqx). This is because the CES unit cost function is assumed. Therefore,
8Eq. (24) in Colangelo and Galmarini (2001, p. 61) also shows a similar result in the
context of vertical oligopoly.
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as a direct effect, an increase in τ monotonically increases revenue from
intermediate goods taxation and total tax revenue. In summary, tax revenue
increases with t and/or τ , and hence these taxes must change in the opposite
way in order to freeze total tax revenue.
Before proceeding further, it is convenient to identify the effect of the
above tax reform on (1 + t)(1 + τ) because it will often appear in the subse-
quent analysis.
Lemma 1 (1 + t)(1 + τ) decreases under the revenue-neutral shift from in-
termediate goods taxation to final goods taxation.
Proof. Totally differentiating (1 + t)(1 + τ) and substituting (8), we have
d[(1 + t)(1 + τ)] = (1 + τ)dt+ (1 + t)dτ
= −(σ + n− 1)(1 + τ)
2
(σ − 1)(n− 1)
dt < 0.
||
We now explain why the revenue-neutral tax reform reduces (1+t)(1+τ).
As mentioned earlier, final goods taxation changes tax revenue through two
channels, but intermediate goods taxation does not. That is, an increase in
t raises total tax revenue by affecting revenue from final goods tax and that
from intermediate goods tax. By contrast, an increase in τ raises total tax
revenue by raising revenue from intermediate goods tax only. Therefore, if
the government raises t and lowers τ by the same amount, total tax revenue
increases. In order to offset the effect of raising t, the government must lower
τ by a larger amount.
In the rest of this section, we examine how the revenue-neutral tax reform
affects the prices of final and intermediate goods. We begin with the tax
incidence on final goods prices. Substituting (7) into (5), the consumer price
10





(σ − 1)(n− 1)
=
(1 + t)σn
(σ − 1)(n− 1)
[
(σ − 1)(n− 1)
(1 + t)(1 + τ)σηnf
] 1
1−η (1 + τ)ηc
η − 1












The price that the final goods producer receives is given by
p
1 + t
= (1 + t)
1












Using these definitions of consumer and producer prices, the effect of the
revenue-neutral tax reform on them is stated as follows.
Proposition 1 Both the consumer and producer prices of final goods de-
crease under the revenue-neutral shift from intermediate goods taxation to
final goods taxation.
Proof. It follows from η/(η− 1) > 0 that the consumer price increases with
(1 + t)(1 + τ). Relating this result to Lemma 1, p also declines.
The tax reform affects the producer price only through the term (1 +
t)
1
η−1 (1 + τ)
η
η−1 . Therefore, all we have to do is to totally differentiate it and






















η−1 (1 + τ)
1
η−1dτ
= − [σ(η − 1)n+ (σ + n− 1)(1 + ητ)](1 + t)
2−η
η−1 (1 + τ)
η
η−1
(σ − 1)(η − 1)(n− 1)
dt < 0,
because the coefficient of dt in the last equation is positive. ||
The intuitions for Proposition 1 are as follows. The effect on the consumer
price is so straightforward that we need no further explanation. In contrast,
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the effect on the producer price of final goods is less transparent than that
on the consumer price. In order to neutralize the effect on tax revenue, the
government lowers τ by more than the initial increase in t as shown in Lemma
1. This reform reduces unit cost of final goods firms Q.9
We now turn to the effect of the revenue-neutral tax reform on the prices
of intermediate goods. The demand price of intermediate goods is q = (1 +
τ)ηc/(η−1), and the producer price is q/(1+τ) = ηc/(η−1) in equilibrium.10
These expressions of intermediate goods prices lead to:
Proposition 2 The demand price of intermediate goods decreases, and the
producer price of intermediate goods is unchanged under the revenue-neutral
shift from intermediate goods taxation to final goods taxation.
This result is interpreted as follows. As Eq. (7) indicates, the final goods
tax affects the upstream industry just by affecting the mass of intermediate
goods. In other words, the producer price of intermediate goods is equal
to marginal cost multiplied by the constant markup 1/(η − 1). So, it is
independent of any tax, and thereby q is affected by τ only. Since the tax
reform reduces τ , the demand price of intermediate goods falls.
4 Welfare Effect
This section examines the welfare effect of the revenue-neutral tax reform.













+ I − 1 = 1
σ − 1
lnn− ln p+ I − 1, (9)
9The revenue-neutral tax reform reduces the unit cost of downstream firms Q =
m1/(1−η)q because both m1/(1−η) and q fall under the reform.
10We use the term ‘demand price,’ instead of ‘consumer price’ to avoid unnecessary
misleading because the consumer does not buy intermediate goods.
11Recall that the oligopolistic firms’ profits and tax revenue are redistributed to the
consumer in a lump-sum way.
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where the last two equations follow from Eq. (4). In the right-hand side,
the first two terms represent the consumer surplus. Invoking the preceding
arguments on the tax incidence, the consumer price of final goods depends
on the two tax rates as follows.












Since the revenue-neutral tax reform reduces the consumer price of final
goods from Proposition 1, the consumer surplus increases.
In contrast, the effect on the profit of each downstream firm and the
downstream industry is shown to be negative. To see this, let us rewrite the








σn− (σ − 1)(n− 1)
σn2(1 + t)
,
where the right-hand side follows by utilizing (5). It is obvious from this
expression that the profit of each firm and the final goods industry decreases
with the suggested tax reform.
By the definition of the reform, tax revenue is unchanged. Accordingly,
the revenue-neutral tax reform increases consumer surplus and decreases ag-
gregate profits of the final goods industry. Despite these conflicting effects,
we can establish that welfare improves under this reform. To this end, let us
derive the closed form of national income I:
I = L+
σn(1 + t)− (σ − 1)(n− 1)
σn(1 + t)
+
(σ − 1)(n− 1)τ
(1 + t)(1 + τ)σn
.
Substituting the above expressions of p and I into (9) and rearranging terms,
welfare depends on the two tax rates as follows.
W = − η
η − 1
ln[(1 + t)(1 + τ)]− (σ − 1)(n− 1)
(1 + t)(1 + τ)σn
+ const. (10)

















Relating this welfare measure to (8), we establish:
Proposition 3 Welfare increases under the revenue-neutral shift from inter-
mediate goods taxation to final goods taxation.
Proof. Differentiating (10) with respect to (1 + t)(1 + τ), we have
dW
d[(1 + t)(1 + τ)]
= − η
(η − 1)(1 + t)(1 + τ)
+
(σ − 1)(n− 1)
σn[(1 + t)(1 + τ)]2
= −σηn(1 + t)(1 + τ)− (σ − 1)(η − 1)(n− 1)
σ(η − 1)n[(1 + t)(1 + τ)]2
< 0.
From Lemma 1, the revenue-neutral tax reform reduces (1 + t)(1 + τ). Con-
sequently, the above inequality implies that the suggested tax reform raises
welfare. ||
As mentioned before, the reform-induced increase in consumer surplus
tends to raise welfare, but the decrease in aggregate downstream profits tends
to lower welfare. However, the positive effect on consumer surplus dominates
the negative effect on aggregate downstream profits, and hence the proposed
tax reform is welfare-enhancing.
In order to better understand Proposition 3, it is useful to characterize
the first-best solution of our model.12 Following Dixit and Stiglitz (1977)


















final good firms’ profit
+ m(qx− cx− f)︸ ︷︷ ︸




12This explanation is highly draws on the suggestions of the referees.
13Note that the tax terms are absent in this objective function from the assumption
that tax revenue is redistributed to the consumer. In other words, this objective function
is obtained even if the tax rates are non-zero.
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1−η−1qy + qx− cx− f (13)
0 = −nm
1
1−η y +mx. (14)
Eq. (11) means equalization of marginal utility and marginal cost with re-
spect to y. Eq. (20) is marginal cost pricing of intermediate goods. Eq. (13)
means equalization of marginal benefit and marginal cost with respect to m.
Eq. (14) is market-clearing of intermediate goods. Solving these equations,
the first-best allocation is14
y =















= c[(η − 1)f ]
1
η−1 . (16)
Not surprisingly, the right-hand side of (16) is marginal cost of final goods,
and hence both final and intermediate goods are priced at marginal cost. In
contrast, the market equilibrium value of q,m, x and p is given by (5) and (7).
Comparing the first-best and market equilibrium, the mass of intermediate
goods is smaller and the price of final and intermediate goods is higher in
the market equilibrium than in the first-best.
In order to correct for the insufficient mass of intermediate goods, the
government needs to cut taxes for intermediate goods. And, the government
must raise the final goods tax to finance the tax cut for intermediate goods.
A similar conclusion is proved in Corollary 2 of Colangelo and Galmarini
14The same value of x and m is obtained if we solve the second-best problem in which
the government chooses only m, taking as given non-competitive pricing of final and
intermediate goods.
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(2001, p. 65), where the revenue-neutral tax reform should consist of final
goods taxation and intermediate goods subsidization. Final goods taxation
alone is welfare-reducing because it raises the final goods price. However, the
tax cut for intermediate goods compensates this negative welfare effect. This
is because the cut of intermediate goods tax reduces marginal cost of final
goods by raising the mass of intermediate goods and lowering their price.
In addition, as Lemma 1 claims, the revenue-neutrality requires that the
magnitude of tax cut for intermediate goods be larger than the tax increase
for final goods. As a result of these observations, the final goods price falls
under our tax reform (Proposition 1). Summarizing these arguments, the
revenue-neutral tax reform corrects for both the insufficient mass of interme-
diate goods and the distortion from monopolistic pricing of final goods firms.
Therefore, by making the market equilibrium closer to the first-best, welfare
improves under the reform.
5 Concluding Remarks
Assuming an oligopoly in the downstream industry and monopolistic com-
petition in the upstream industry, this paper has explored the effects of the
revenue-neutral shift from upstream taxation to downstream taxation. First,
this tax reform reduces the consumer and producer prices of final goods. Sec-
ond, it reduces the demand price of intermediate good, and has no effect on
the producer price of intermediate goods. Third, welfare improves with this
tax reform.
As noted in Introduction, to our knowledge, there is no literature that
analyzes the effects of the revenue-neutral tax reform in vertically related
markets, except for Colangelo and Galmarini (2001). While Colangelo and
Galmarini (2001) assume that both downstream and upstream industries are
oligopolistic, and hence firms make positive profits. And, they assume away
product differentiation. Instead, we have assumed that the intermediate
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goods market is monopolistically competitive, and all goods are differenti-
ated. It is beyond the scope of this paper whether our model and assump-
tions describe the reality better than the previous papers, but we hopefully
believe that we have provided an interesting insight into theoretical analyses
of taxation.
However, we must recognize the limitations of this paper. First, we have
used the CES function of the consumer’s subutility and unit cost of final
goods. This specification allows us to facilitate analysis and get the closed-
form solutions of equilibrium. Second, we have resorted to a partial equi-
librium analysis under the assumption of quasi-linear preference. If we take
account of the income effect on the final goods demand, our results may be
invalid. Third, we have employed the model of homogeneous firms, but it is
theoretically and empirically well-established that firm heterogeneity plays
a key role in shaping the industry structure since Melitz (2003). It is the
future research agenda to enrich our analysis by taking into account of these
limitations.
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The results in the main text are based on restrictive assumptions. This note
discusses the robustness of the results in alternative settings.
Bertrand Oligopoly
It is the most important concern whether the above results survive a Bertrand
downstream oligopoly. The Bertrand equilibrium price is given by
p =
(1 + t)(σn− σ + 1)Q
(σ − 1)(n− 1)
.
In other words, the markup is σn/(σ−1)(n−1) and (σn−σ+1)/(σ−1)(n−1)
in Cournot and Bertrand competition, respectively. Therefore, our results
straightforwardly hold in both the Cournot and Bertrand cases.
Endogenous Number of Downstream Firms
While we have treated n as an exogenous variable, we now endogenize it.
With this endogenization of n, the welfare effect of the revenue-neutral tax
reform is shown to be ambiguous. To see this, denote by F > 0 the fixed
cost of final goods firms. Then, the maximized profit per-firm becomes
π =
σn− (σ − 1)(n− 1)
(1 + t)σn2
− F.







, A ≡ 1 + 4(1 + t)σ(σ − 1)F > 0. (17)
Differentiating this with respect to t yields
dn
dt








That is, the number of final goods firms decreases with t. Substituting (17)





2(1 + t)(1 + τ)σηf
. (18)
In order for m to be positive, we assume that 2σ − 1−
√
A > 0.
In the present case, neither upstream nor downstream firms make profit.
Hence, national income consists of labor income and tax revenue, both of
which are unchanged with the revenue-neutral tax reform. That is, the wel-

















(σ − 1)(n− 1)
=
[
(1 + t)(1 + τ)σηn







where use is made of (18) and (7). Substituting this expression of p into (19)
and rearranging terms, we have
CS =
η − 1− η(σ − 1)







ln[(1 + t)(1 + τ)] + const., (20)











Totally differentiating (20), the welfare effect of tax change is
dW = dCS =
η(σ − 1) + (η − 1)(n− 1)
n(n− 1)(σ − 1)(η − 1)
dn− η
(1 + t)(1 + τ)(η − 1)
d[(1 + t)(1 + τ)].(21)
The first term in the right-hand side is the effect through a change in n and
the second term is the direct effect of the reform. The rest of our task is to
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compute the effect of the revenue-neutral tax reform on dn and d(1+t)(1+τ).











2(1 + t)(1 + τ)σ

















It follows from this equation that the revenue-neutral tax reform affects dn
and d[(1 + t)(1 + τ)] in (21) as follows.

























In words, the revenue-neutral tax reform decreases n and (1+ t)(1+ τ). The
reform-induced decrease in the number of final good firms tends to reduce
welfare, but the decrease in (1+ t)(1+τ) tends to raise welfare. Due to these
conflicting effects, it is ambiguous that welfare improves. Indeed, substituting
these results into (21) leads to
dW =

−η(σ − 1) + (η − 1)(n− 1)
n(n− 1)(σ − 1)(η − 1)
















+ 2(1 + t)(2 + τ)σ(σ − 1)F
]












The intuition for this ambiguous result is obvious. As mentioned in the
main text, the revenue neutrality requires the government to raise t and lower
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τ . This increase in t leads to a decrease in the number of final goods firms.
As a result of the decreased number of firms, the price of final goods becomes
higher. This tends to reduce welfare. In contrast, the tax reform raises the
mass of intermediate goods and lowere their price, as was the case in the
main text. This tends to raise welfare. Due to these conflicting effects, it is
unclear whether welfare improves.
Specific Tax
If the tax form is specific, m is not explicitly solved, and hence we can not
obtain a clear result. Someone may claim that the welfare effect of the tax
reform is possible to derive by using the implicit function theorem even if
the closed form of m can not be obtained. However, at least for our purpose,
solvability of m is very essential. In order to see this, let t and τ be the
specific tax rate on final and intermediate goods, respectively. Then, the








Substituting these results in (6), we have a non-linear equation in m.

















η−1 (η − 1)2f





m(η − 1)[σηnmf − (σ − 1)(η − 1)]
η(c+ τ)[σnmf − (σ − 1)(n− 1)]
. (23)
We now find the rule of the revenue-neutral tax reform. Tax revenue in
the present case is given by
T =
(σ − 1)(n− 1)
σn(Q+ t)︸ ︷︷ ︸
revenue from final good tax
+
τm(η − 1)f
c+ τ︸ ︷︷ ︸
revenue from intermediate goods tax
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Noting that taxes affect m and differentiating this expression with respect to

























− tm ηη−1 − τm
 ,
where dm/dt and dm/dτ are given by (22) and (23), respectively. By dividing
the first equation by the second equation, the revenue-neutral tax reform is
obtained by
dτ = − dT/dt
dT/dτ
dt.
However, the sign of both the denominator and the numerator in the right-
hand side is unclear, and hence the welfare effect of the revenue-neutral tax
reform is also unclear.
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